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How Good is PPP?
An important issue facing policymakers is the
role of the exchange rate in the conduct of
monetary policy. In recent years, some analysts
have urged that u.s. monetary policy target the
value of the dollar. Such a policy approach, they
argue, would reduce the wide swings and "mis-
alignments" in the value of the dollar and would
diminish the associated effects on international
competitiveness and macroeconomic activity
experienced during the floating exchange rate
period.
To target the exchange rate requires some
notion ofwhat is the "equilibrium" value of the
exchange rate. One popular view is that a cur-
rency's equilibrium level is best associated with
its international purchasing power parity (PPP).
In its most common form, PPP asserts that the
exchange rate between two currencies ought to
adjust so that the real, or inflation-adjusted, price
of a given basket of goods is the same in both
countries.
A PPPtargeting rule, then, implies that monetary
policy should adjust whenever the actual value
of the currency diverged sufficiently from its PPP
"equilibrium" level. Based on PPP calculations,
some have argued that, despite the dollar's recent
rise, it is still undervalued by roughly 30 percent
against the Japanese yen and 10 percent against
the German Deutschemark. To raise the value of
the dollar to its PPP level, they maintain that
the Federal Reserve should promote the further
appreciation of the dollar by tightening monetary
policy.
This Letter evaluates whether purchasing power
parity is an appropriate guide to monetary policy,
finding that because the dollar's deviations from
PPP appear to be large and persistent, the use of
PPP as a target for monetary policy does not
appear justifiable.
What is PPP?
There are several versions of PPP theory. The
"absolute" form of purchasing power parity,
sometimes referred to as the law of one price,
implies that the price of a common basket of
goods in any two countries should be equal
when measured in common currency. On theo-
retical grounds, the law of one price should be
enforced by international arbitrage. For example,
if automobiles were selling at a lower price in
Japan than in the United States, international
arbitragers could profitby buying them in Japan
and selling them in the United States. This in-
creased demand for Japanese goods would cause
the value of the yen to rise, and car prices to rise
in Japan and/or fall in the U.S. until equality was
restored.
Of course, the prices of particular goods may
vary in different locations at any given time,
since transportation costs and other obstacles to
trade mean that goods arbitrage generally is not
perfect and instantaneous. PPP in its "relative"
form maintains that although the price levels of
goods in different countries may deviate from
one another, the rate ofchange in goods prices
should be roughly the same across countries, as-
suming that transportation costs, tariffs, and other
barriers to trade remain roughly constant over
time. In other words, starting from some base
equilibrium period, this version ofPPP implies
that increases or decreases in the prices of the
same products at home and abroad ought to be
equal when valued in a common currency. More-
over, variants of this form of PPP often make
allowances for lead/lag relationships between
price and exchange rate changes, implying that
. prices and exchange rates are eventually, but not
immediately, offsetting.
Short-run failure
There are different ways to test the PPP rela-
tionship. One approach is to compare price
changes across countries at the level of narrowly-
defined categories of manufactured goods, such
as paper and apparel. Empirical analyses that
have done so, however, have found evidence of
persistent deviations from PPP for manufactured
goods between prices of goods sold in the
domestic market and of those sold for export,
between prices of domestic goods and of com-
peting import substitutes, and among the prices
of goods sold for export to different markets.FABSF
Empirical times-series studies using aggregate
price indices also show evidence of persistent
deviations from PPP. The chart shows the real
foreign exchange value of the dollar relative to
the yen, Deutschemark, and British pound over
the period from the first quarter of 1973 through·
the last quarter.of 1988. The measures plotted use
GNP deflators and are based to 1979 (that is,
1979 = 100) when the u.s. current account was
last near balance,rand presumably, the dollar
would be at its PPP equilibrium level.
analyzed for relatively narrow commodity cate-
gories. Is a Honda Accord the equivalent of a
Ford Taurus? Another explanation is that tests of
PPP generally fail to recognize that many goods
and services (the prices of which are included in
measures of a country's price level) are not traded
across borders. Housing, land, and services such
as haircuts and golf lessons, for example, are not
traded goods. Commodity arbitrage will equalize
prices of internationally-traded goods, but not of
nontraded goods.
During this period,the real exchang~ value of
the dollar deviated substantially and persistently
from its levelin 1979. In the early 1980s, in par-
ticular, the real foreign exchange value of the
dollar rose significantly above its level in 1979,
implying thedollar was greatly overvalued rela-
tive to. its purchasing power parity in 1979. (The
general results are unchanged with the use of
alternative price indices, such as consumer price
or wholesale price indices, or with different
choices of a base equilibrium year.)
Other tests of PPP theory have focussed on
correlations between the rates of change in GNP
deflators in different countries, with inflation
rates measured in dollar terms. The relative PPP
theory predicts a high degree ofpositive cor-
relation. However,when these correlations are
calculatedfor the U.S., Japan,and Germany, the
correlations found are often negative, Even if
allowances arernade for priceadjustment over
longer periods, the correlations found are weak.
Reasons for failure
PPP clearly does not hold in the 19705 and
19805. OneJ)bvious e)(planation is thatgoods
are not identical across countries, even when
Bilateral Real Value of Dollar
Movements in the real exchange rate away from
its long-run equilibrium level also occur when
nominal exchange rates are extremely sensitive
to changes in asset marketswhile goods prices
are "sticky." Thus, for example, a disturbance
Thus, it appears that PPP does not hold in the
short run primarily because other factors, such as
fiscal deficits, oil supply changes, and productiv-
ity growth, also affect the equilibrium exchange
rate. The significant deterioration in the explana-
tory power of PPP in the 1970s and 1980s has
been attributed by many analysts to the greater
extent of real shocks in the world economy in
that period, including fiscal spending imbalances
and changes in oil supply. For example, much of
the real appreciation of the dollar in the early
1980s generally is attributedto the u.s. fiscal
stimulus at that time.
The existence of differential rates of productivity
growth also can lead to the failure of PPP. Pro-
ductivity gains in the tradable goods sector will
cause wages to rise economy-wide on account of
competitive increases in wages in the nontraded
sector. In the absence of accompanying produc-
tivity gains in the nontraded goods sector, these
wage increases will cause the general price level
to rise. This increase in the country's price level
relative to that abroad implies a real appreciation
of its currency. Ma.ny argue that the much higher
productivity growth ofJapan has contributed to a
trend of rea.1 appreciation of the yen relative to
the dollar.
However, these "measurement" problems are
not the whole story behind failures of PPP. Cal-
culations using alternative measures that to some
extent better capture the prices of traded goods
alone, such as producer price indices, still show












73 75 77 79 81that leads to an immediate response in the nomi-
nal exchange rate but only sluggish response in
prices can lead to a departure from PPP.
PPP works in the long-run
While PPP fails in the short run, over a suffi-
ciently long period, it is possible that the effects
of disturbances and structural changes will tend
to cancel out, and that deviations from PPP will
dissipate.
Professor Jeffrey Frankel has used annual data
over the period from 1869 to 1984 to estimate the
extent to which the dollar/pound exchange rate
returns to PPP equilibrium. For the period as a
whole, he finds that the estimated speed of ad-
justment to PPP is 14 percent per year. In other
words, after four and a half years, 50 percent of
the adjustment towards PPP takes place and after
fifteen years, 90 percent of the adjustment takes
place. Within shorter subperiods there is also
evidence of adjustment towards PPp, but the
estimates are less reliable statistically.
These results indicate that although the exchange
rate takes a long time to adjust to its equilibrium
level, economic forces appear to be at work to
maintain PPP levels. Thus it may be said that PPP
provides a fair, though rough, approximation of
the long-run exchange rate if the adjustment
process is viewed over many years.
Policy implications
To be useful as a guide to monetary policy, the
purchasing power parity value of a currency
needs to be stable. While there is some evidence
that PPP holds over the long run when measured
by several decades, an horizon of this length is of
little relevance to policymakers. Over a shorter
horizon, there is no evidence that PPP holds.
During the 1970s and 1980s, deviations from PPP
apparently were large and persistent, largely
because real disturbances altered the equilibrium
real exchange rate.
Thus, attempts by monetary authorities to reduce
the variability of exchange rates around their PPP
levels likely would have been unsuccessful in the
sense that distortions in individual countries'
price levels would have been introduced. If, for
example, the Federal Reserve had been targeting
the dollar around its PPP value and attempted to
offset the appreciating dollar assoCiated with the
persistent fiscal stimulus between 1982 and 1985,
monetary policy would have been significantly
more expansionary than actually was the case.
This monetary stimulus would have kept the
nominal value of the dollar from appreciating,
but would have pushed inflation significantly
higher, making U.S.-produced goods more ex-
pensive, despite the unchanged nominal value of
the dollar. The real value of the dollar still would
have tended to rise on account of the fiscal stim-
ulus. Hence, it is apparent that an attempt by the
Fed to maintain a PPP target for the dollar pri-
marily would have shifted the effects away from
the nominal exchange rate towards the domestic
price level.
In view of the evidence against the existence of
stable PPP relationships, the use of PPP currency
levels as a target of monetary policy does not
appear justifiable, particularly when real shocks
also affect the equilibrium value of a given
currency. This does not mean, however, that the
exchange rate should not play any role in the
conduct of monetary policy. Exchange rate
changes can have an effect on domestic price
stability and real growth. In response to these
potential effects, it still may be appropriate for




Opinions expressed in this newsletter do not necessarily reflect the views of the management of the Federal Reserve Bank of
San Francisco, or of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Editorial comments may be adilressed to the editor (Barbara Bennett) or to the author.... Free copies of Federal Reserve
publications can be obtained from the Public Information Department, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, P.O. Box 7702,
San Francisco 94120. Phone (415) 974-2246.OUt6 v:) 'OJSpueJ:I ueS
WLL: xOll ·O·d
O)SI)UOJ::J UOS
JO ~uo8
aAJaSa~ IOJapa::J
~uaw~Jodaa 4)Joasa~